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The Great Recession of 2007-2009 placed a heavy strain on state unemployment insurance (UI) programs and their method of fi nancing. This short chapter introduces and discusses several aspects of the state UI responses during and after the downturn. Individual programs within the state UI system are highly varied. Whereas many states still have low net balances in their UI trust fund accounts at the Treasury, many other states have restored their trust funds to prerecession or even higher levels. This chapter documents the varied fi nancing responses of the state programs to the recession with special attention to a number of specifi c elements in their responses. The chapter also assesses the health of the state trust funds as of mid-2016.
PROGRAM FINANCING RESPONSES
Two factors that contributed to the fi nancing diffi culties experienced by state UI programs during and after the Great Recession were the low level of reserves prior to the recession and the severity (both depth and duration) of the downturn. At the end of March 2011, the states had trust fund debts that exceeded $40 billion. At the end of June 2016, net reserves totaled roughly $36 billion. While the states still owed approximately $8 billion, this $76 billion turnaround was achieved by taking several distinct types of state-level actions.
Trust fund restoration was achieved both by actions that increased tax revenue and those that reduced UI benefi t payments. Table 4 .1 summarizes six diff erent actions that states took aff ecting revenues. For each type of fi nancing response, the states are sorted according to their prerecession reserve ratio multiple (RRM, also termed the average high-cost multiple [AHCM] ) measured at the end of 2007.
1 The RRM is an index of trust fund adequacy that incorporates information on three factors: past payouts, the current trust fund balance, and the size of a state's economy. The latter is approximated by the total payroll of employers covered by the UI program in each state. Higher RRM levels signal more adequate trust fund balances. An RRM equal to 1.0 means there are 12 months of benefi ts in the trust fund, and many view an RRM of 1.0 as signaling an adequate UI trust fund balance. Column (1) in Table 4 .1 summarizes the distribution of RRMs for the 51 UI programs 2 at the end of 2007 or just prior to the Great Recession. The mean and median RRMs for the 51 programs of 0.54 and 0.43 indicate that the average prerecession trust fund balances were about half of the balances needed to meet the suggested actuarial standard of 1.0. Only seven states had an RRM of 1.0 or higher and 30 had RRMs below 0.50, so many states entered the Great Recession with low trust fund reserve balances.
Columns (2) to (7) identify the number of states undertaking specifi c revenue-enhancing actions. The identifi cation of specifi c actions in individual states is somewhat arbitrary, refl ecting my own judgments. The 15 states in column (2) allowed their UI tax laws to operate as written in their tax statutes. These states moved to higher tax rate schedules and made other adjustments automatically without legislative changes. Note that these states had trust funds with mean and median RRMs of 0.92 and 0.83, respectively, much larger than the group as a whole. This group also included 11 of the 13 states with a prerecession RRM of 0.75 or higher. Having large trust funds meant that these states had limited need for loans from the Treasury, and only two (Alabama and Maryland) borrowed from the Treasury from 2009 to 2012.
Column (3) summarizes fi ve states that took early policy actions to avoid or reduce the volume of borrowing. All fi ve of these states had low prerecession reserves, with RRMs below 0.50. Three of the fi ve (New Hampshire, South Dakota, and Tennessee) instituted temporary quarterly taxes to enhance revenue. These taxes were to sunset when the trust fund's recovery was deemed adequate by program administrators.
Prior to the Great Recession, 16 states plus the Virgin Islands had indexed taxable wage bases with increases tied automatically to changes in statewide average wages. Following the recession, three states adopted indexation. In two, the tax base started to increase automatically in 2013 (Colorado and Rhode Island). In the third, Vermont, the base increased from $8,000 in 2009 to $16,000 in 2012, with indexed increases commencing in 2015.
During and after the recession, 11 states increased their tax bases by at least 50 percent (column [5] ). The largest increases occurred in Delaware, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Vermont, where the tax base at least doubled between 2007 and 2015. Note that the states making these large increases had a prerecession average RRM that about matched the national average.
Six of the eight states that issued municipal bonds (column [6]) had prerecession RRMs below 0.50. Four of these states (Illinois, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Texas) issued municipal bonds with long maturities (fi nal maturities of 2020 or later). Each of the four used the proceeds from the bonds to repay Treasury loans that carried higher interest rates than the bonds. The issuances could be described as arbitrage (or debt-restructuring) transactions that delayed repayment dates as well as secured lower interest rates. It is quite likely some of these bonds will still be outstanding when the U.S. economy enters the next recession.
If a state's debt to the Treasury is outstanding on January 1 of two consecutive years and not fully repaid by November 10 of the second year, it may be subject to Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) credit off sets payable in January of the following year. Roughly half the state UI programs were subject to FUTA credit offsets in at least one year between 2009 and 2015. From 2012 to 2015, these added federal taxes accounted for 10 percent or more of state UI tax revenue in nine states. These nine states had very low prerecession reserves, with seven of nine RRMs falling below 0.25 in 2007 (column [7] ). These states exhausted their trust funds early in the recession and became subject to FUTA credit off sets in 2012.
Several of the nine states experienced prolonged indebtedness to the Treasury, hence multiple years of reduced FUTA credit off sets. The mean and median RRMs for these states in 2007 are the lowest of any group in Table 4 .1, both below 0.20.
FUTA CREDIT REDUCTIONS
As just noted, one feature of the Great Recession was the widespread and prolonged indebtedness of most state UI trust funds. From 2009 to 2011, 35 state programs (36 including the Virgin Islands) borrowed from the Treasury. Many states had debts for multiyear periods, and 11 programs were still making debt repayments in April 2016.
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Because these debts were outstanding for multiyear periods, 26 programs were subject to the automatic debt repayment through reductions in their FUTA tax credits. Typically 5.4 percent of the 6.0 percent FUTA tax levied on the fi rst $7,000 of taxable payroll is waived in states with acceptable experience-rating systems. However, if Treasury loans are outstanding on January 1 of two consecutive years and not fully repaid by November 10 of the second year, the 5.4 percent FUTA tax waiver usually starts to be reduced, with the reduction payable in January of the following year. The initial reduction is 0.3 percent of federal taxable payroll ($21), but the reduction then grows with each successive year of continued indebtedness.
From 2009 to 2015, 24 states and the Virgin Islands were subject to FUTA credit reductions. Eighteen states plus the Virgin Islands experienced credit reductions for three or more years during this period. The aggregate revenue from the credit reductions totaled $10.7 billion, with $10.4 billion paid from 2012 to 2015. 4 Total state UI taxes (including FUTA credit reductions) paid during this period were $128.3 billion. Thus, over these four years, the credit reductions accounted for 8.3 percent of total state UI tax revenue.
The FUTA credit reductions were of varying importance in individual states. Table 4 .2 focuses on the experiences of 18 states from 2012 to 2015, the 13 largest states (in terms of taxable covered employment in 2013) and fi ve other states where FUTA credit reductions accounted for at least 5.0 percent of total UI tax revenue during the period. The 13 largest states were singled out for two reasons: 1) they dominate in aggregate UI program performance, accounting for about two-thirds of tax revenue and benefi t payments; and 2) their debt repayment behavior diff ers from that of smaller states, as documented in Vroman (2016) . Only 2 of the 13 largest states (Texas and Massachusetts) were not subject to FUTA credit reductions from 2012 to 2015. Texas issued municipal bonds in late 2010, while Massachusetts incurred debts for just a few months during 2011. The other 11 states paid $8.0 billion in credit off sets, about 77 percent of the national total in that four-year period.
With widespread trust fund restoration now underway, 2017 and 2018 may be the fi nal years when FUTA credit off sets will make a measurable contribution to state UI tax revenue. Estimates made at the Urban Institute indicate that the credit reductions will total $2.0 billion in 2017 (California) and $2.4 billion in 2018 (again California). Although the payments could extend into 2019, it seems more likely that California's trust fund balance on November 10, 2018, will be positive, obviating the need for a credit off set in 2019. If this is the case, FUTA credit off sets will have been active for nine consecutive years from 2010 to 2018, with total off sets exceeding $18.0 billion. Although FUTA credit off sets have helped many states to repay their debts, their positive eff ect on tax revenue occurs only in years when a state's net trust fund balance is negative. Once the net balance starts to consistently exceed zero, these added UI taxes automatically stop. Thus, only California, Connecticut, Ohio, and the Virgin Islands paid FUTA credit off sets in 2016. FUTA credit off sets, in other words, help states eliminate negative trust fund balances, but they do not continue to help in fund building after a positive balance has been achieved.
To summarize the responses of the state UI tax systems following the Great Recession, four points should be emphasized. 1) The individual states responded in a wide variety of ways, and Table 4 .1 summarizes the responses. 2) About one-third of the states, mostly those with adequate prerecession reserves, allowed their experiencerating systems to operate as specifi ed in their state statutes. These states had limited need for Treasury loans, and their trust funds have been restored to generally high levels. 3) Eleven states made large increases in their taxable wage bases, and each of them had a tax base in 2015 that was at least 50 percent higher than it had been in 2007. 4) One-third of the states either issued municipal bonds (eight) or allowed FUTA credit reductions to account for at least 10 percent of their postrecession tax revenue responses (nine). Neither strategy promoted robust trust fund recoveries. The states that issued bonds deferred part of their debt repayment until much later time periods. The FUTA credit off sets stopped contributing to trust fund recoveries after net trust fund balances became positive. Both strategies retarded the restoration of adequate trust fund balances in the states that followed these policies.
POSTRECESSION RESPONSES OF STATE UI BENEFITS
Improvements in fund solvency also can be achieved through benefi t reductions. Over the long run, of course, benefi t reductions also weaken the performance of UI as an automatic stabilizer of the macro economy. Documenting the recent changes in program benefi ts can provide a basis for estimating how much UI's stabilizing performance has been weakened.
Among various benefi t adjustments made by states following the Great Recession, three were particularly prevalent, one passive and two active. The passive adjustment was not increasing the maximum weekly benefi t for several consecutive years. One active adjustment was reducing the maximum number of potential weeks of regular UI benefi ts starting in 2011. The other active adjustment was increasing the amount of administrative activity to monitor payment accuracy, which, coupled with ongoing problems of program administration, could adversely aff ect receipt of benefi ts.
Changes in the Replacement Rate
About half the state programs operate with an indexed maximum weekly benefi t that increases automatically as statewide wages increase. Other states raise the maximum periodically by state legislation. Several of these latter states have not increased their maximum benefi ts for many years.
To document the prevalence of this nonadjustment pattern, each state's maximum weekly benefi t amount (WBA) was noted for January 2016 and for previous Januarys, and the number of consecutive Januarys with the same maximum was counted. Of the 24 states without an indexed maximum, the number of consecutive years with an unchanged maximum ranged from 4 to 19. In all but one state, the maximum WBA was unchanged for at least 5 consecutive years, and in fi ve states, it ranged from 13 to 19 (Florida). The mean for the 24 states was 9.75 years, and the average 2016 maximum WBA had been unchanged for a decade.
From 2004 to 2015, the annual earnings in taxable covered employment nationwide increased from $39,141 to $52,066 or by 33.0 percent. For a state with average wage infl ation and whose maximum was stable during 12 consecutive years, the maximum benefi t would be 33.0 percent lower relative to annual wages at the end of the period. This decrease would exert a downward pressure on the replacement rate (the ratio of weekly benefi ts to the average weekly wage).
5 Because so many states have operated with unchanged maximum benefi ts for several consecutive years, many replacement rates have also been adversely aff ected. 
Potential Benefi t Duration
An important recent change in several state UI programs has been to reduce maximum potential benefi t duration. Since 2011, eight states have reduced maximum potential duration to fewer than 26 weeks, and at least one additional state (Idaho) planned to implement a reduction in 2017. The reductions follow four decades when all state programs off ered at least 26 weeks of potential benefi ts in every year. 8 During the fi rst half of 2016, maximum duration was between 12 and 20 weeks in these eight states, and three of them have reduced potential benefi t duration twice since 2011. 9 In the rest of this section, I examine the eff ects of the benefi t reductions on benefi t recipiency as well as the overall benefi t recipiency rates in individual states. Figure 4 .2 shows maximum potential benefi t duration in the eight states that paid fewer than 26 weeks of potential benefi ts during the fi rst half of 2016. The maximum durations ranged from 12 weeks (Florida) to 20 weeks (Arkansas, Michigan, Missouri, and South Carolina). Shorter potential benefi t durations would be expected to reduce the recipiency rate (the ratio of weekly benefi ciaries to weekly unemployment) through shorter periods of potential eligibility and more rapid exhaustion of benefi ts. Another potential determinant of the recipiency rate is the unemployment rate, because average unemployment duration increases during recessions when unemployment increases. The approach followed here is to fi t recipiency rate regressions for a period prior to the reduction in potential benefi t duration, project the recipiency rate for later periods, and examine projection errors with particular attention to periods of shorter potential duration. A recipiency rate regression using annual data was fi tted for each state for the years 1967 to 2007. Each regression used two explanatory variables: the state's current total unemployment rate (TUR) and TUR lagged one year. Table 4A .1 presents the regressions. Table 4A .1 shows that state-level recipiency rates display considerable short-run noise. Although the table has regressions for 51 UI programs, the eight highlighted in bold in the table are shown in The coeffi cient patterns for the TUR variables are consistent. All current TURs have positive coeffi cients, and six have t ratios of at least 2.0, a common threshold for statistical signifi cance. All eight lagged TURs have negative coeffi cients, and all eight have t ratios of least 2.0. The recipiency rate increases in years with high unemployment rates but then decreases when the lagged unemployment rate is high.
The regressions in Table 4A .1 were used to project recipiency rates through 2015. Two sets of average projection errors are shown in Table 4 . 3: 2008 to 2011 and 2012 to 2015 . Note that all projections are for years beyond the regressions' estimation periods, which ended in 2007, and that nearly all of the reductions in average potential duration below 26 weeks occurred during 2012 to 2015, the latter of the two four-year projection periods.
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The reduced maximum durations would be expected to cause larger projection errors during 2012 to 2015 as compared to 2008 to 2011, and the average projection errors for the two periods generally support this expectation. Six of eight averages are negative (i.e., they are overprojections) in the fi rst period, but all eight are negative in the second. Six of eight equations were overprojecting by larger amounts during the fi rst period relative to the second one; that is, the changes in these four-year averages are negative in all states but Georgia and Kansas. When the changes are examined for individual states (bottom row of Table 4 .3), note that fi ve changes are more negative than -0.045 (Florida, North Carolina, Michigan, South Carolina, and Arkansas). The projection analysis indicates that recipiency declined in the period of 2012 to 2015, the period when potential duration decreased in these states. The explanation for the decline may include factors besides changes in potential duration. For example, changes in UI program administration could be linked to the decreases. On the other hand, the 2012 to 2015 period was characterized by much lower unemployment than that of 2008 to 2011. Thus, the analysis yielded results consistent with the expectation that a shorter potential duration reduced recipiency rates in these eight states.
UI Program Administration
State UI administrative activities are fi nanced mainly by grants allocated by the Offi ce of UI, which is part of the Employment and Training Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor. These administrative grants are based mainly on workloads related to UI claims. About one-fi fth of the states supplement their federal grants with state resources.
Over the past 20 years, program administration has evolved away from face-to-face contact between claimants and administrators to electronic contacts, either by telephone or over the Internet. Nearly all decisions aff ecting initial eligibility and continuing eligibility are now made through electronic media, with Internet claims accounting for more than half of all administrative decisions related to UI eligibility.
Several ongoing challenges have been faced in the transition to electronic program administration, particularly in providing timely and accurate eligibility decisions. The computer IT systems in many states use old programming languages, and updating them has proven challenging. Also, since administrative allocations are closely linked to claims volume, fi nancial support has decreased as the economic recovery has progressed.
A recent analysis by the U.S. Government Accountability Offi ce (GAO) documented these challenges with results from a recent survey of all states and intensive interviews with claimant focus groups in three states (GAO 2016) . Frequent problems with telephone claims identifi ed by the GAO were long wait times, frequent dropped calls, diffi culty in reaching program representatives, and frequent abandoned calls. Inadequate staffi ng was identifi ed as a major cause of these problems. Inadequate administrative funding and outmoded IT systems also were frequently identifi ed as underlying causes of administrative problems.
In recent years, the national offi ce of the UI program has placed greater emphasis on payment accuracy. Increased emphasis is being paid to the states' Benefi t Accuracy Measurement reports, which summarize payment accuracy and identify the source(s) of payment errors by the party (claimant, employer, or agency) and individual administrative process, and also include estimates of claimant fraud. While no research has thoroughly documented the eff ects of the administrative problems and increased emphasis on payment accuracy, these factors could be contributing to a decrease in UI recipiency. These administrative issues are present in all states to some degree, and they may have macro consequences in reducing the recipiency rate.
RECIPIENCY RATES IN INDIVIDUAL STATES
To develop a more nuanced understanding of the recent decline in UI recipiency, a state-level regression analysis was conducted. For each state, a background time series regression was fi tted using annual data. The estimation period was from 1967 to 2007, the 41 years prior to the onset of the Great Recession. For each state, the recipiency rate was regressed on TUR and TUR lagged one year. The recipiency rate measure was the ratio of weekly regular UI benefi ciaries to weekly total unemployment (the WKTU ratio), the latter measured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
It is well known that the recipiency rate increases at the start of a recession when unemployment increases but then declines in later periods because of UI benefi t exhaustion and other factors. Hence, the regressions included the current and lagged TURs as explanatory variables. In the highly varied labor markets of individual states, local factors besides unemployment undoubtedly also infl uence the recipiency rate, but this analysis used only the two unemployment rate variables as arguments to explain variation in state-level WKTU ratios.
After fi tting the regressions, the equations were then used to project the recipiency rate for the eight years following the end of the estimation period, that is, from 2008 to 2015. The patterns in the projection errors were then examined. Table 4A An important fi nding of this analysis is that on average recipiency in the most recent years has decreased in most state UI programs. Actual recipiency rates during 2012 to 2015 fell below projected recipiency rates in 43 of 51 programs. The decrease in recipiency apparent in national data (shown below) has occurred in most of the individual state programs that make up the system of regular UI programs.
What underlies the decrease in UI recipiency? Since recipiency rates in the eight reduced-duration states decreased more than in the other states, one part of the explanation is the reductions in maximum potential duration. However, there must be other factors, as evidenced by the widespread negative error averages in the 43 other states during 2012 to 2015. The exact cause (or causes) for the decrease in recipiency cannot be determined from the regression analysis presented here. What the regressions in Table 4A .1 do show, however, is that the recent decrease in the recipiency rate has been widespread throughout the system of state UI programs.
THE UI PROGRAM NATIONWIDE
The fi nal section of this chapter examines the regular state UI program at the national level, with attention to benefi t recipiency and the aggregate trust fund. The analysis concentrates on the years from 2006 to 2015, that is, from just before the Great Recession to fi ve years after it ended. Figure 4 .3 displays the ratio of weekly regular UI claims to unemployment (IUTU ratio), as measured in the monthly labor force survey from 2006 to 2015. A salient feature of the fi gure is the contrast in the recipiency rate prior to the Great Recession and the recipiency rate since 2012. The average monthly IUTU ratio between January 2006 and December 2007 was 0.356, whereas between January 2012 and December 2015, the average IUTU ratio was 0.268, or 24.7 percent below the average for 2006 and 2007. Note also that the IUTU ratio does not display a pronounced upward trend during 2012 to 2015 (at most an increase of 0.030) as the economy was moving closer to full employment. The UI recipiency rate is now substantially lower than it was prior to the Great Recession. This decline will have adverse eff ects on the performance of state UI as an automatic stabilizer when the U.S. economy experiences the next recession. Figure 4 .4 traces the overall net trust fund balance of the state UI programs from the end of 2005 to mid-2016. The quarterly patterns clearly show how reserves are lowest at the end of the fi rst calendar quarter and then recover sharply during April and May when fi rst quarter tax accruals are received. Figure 4 .4 also shows the continuing presence of outstanding municipal bond principal (i.e., the vertical distance between total net reserves and the net reserves at the Treasury). At the end of June 2016, the states owed approximately $4.5 billion in the municipal bond market as well as approximately $3.5 billion to the U.S. Treasury. These debts were owed by UI programs in eight states plus the Virgin Islands, despite the fact that seven full years have elapsed since the end of the Great Recession.
Finally, note that net reserves at the end of June 2016 totaled $36.0 billion, which was nearly back to the prerecession level of approximately $40.0 billion. However, since the covered payroll in 2016 was more than 20 percent greater than it was in 2007, net reserves should be roughly $48 billion to just match the reserve ratio at the end of 2007. Thus, while substantial trust fund building has occurred since the trough of the recession, the net balance would have to have been 24 percent higher than it was just to be equivalent to the balance at the end of 2007.
Although the aggregate net trust fund was about three-fourths of the way to matching the balance at the end of 2007, the situation in individual state programs remains highly varied. In 19 states, the reserve ratio (net reserves as a percent of total payroll) at the end of June 2016 matched or exceeded its level at the end of 2007. However, net reserves were still negative in 2 states (California and Pennsylvania) plus the Virgin Islands, and another 11 had reserve ratios of less than half of their 2007 reserve ratios. In short, reserves in individual states were highly varied at the end of June 2016, and many states still had very low or negative net reserves.
Even though substantial progress has been made in trust fund restoration, more fund building is needed to return to the reserve posi- tion held just prior to the Great Recession. Given the inadequacy of reserves at the start of the Great Recession and the subsequent amount of state borrowing, prudent fund management requires continued trust fund building in the immediate future.
Compared to the years prior to the Great Recession, the benefi t side of the state system of UI programs is now measurably smaller. The orders of magnitude presented here suggest that the recipiency rate is approximately 25 percent lower (0.268 compared to 0.356) than prior to the Great Recession, while the benefi t replacement rate is about 7 percent lower (0.328 compared to 0.354). Combined, these two changes suggest the benefi t side of the UI system is now only about 70 percent as generous as it was prior to the Great Recession. While benefi t reductions have contributed to the recovery of state UI trust funds, they have also signifi cantly reduced the generosity of the system of state UI programs. These reductions in benefi t generosity will permanently weaken the performance of UI as an automatic stabilizer in future recessions.
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1. The RRM is the ratio of two ratios. The numerator is the reserve ratio, which is the end-of-year trust fund balance (net of UI debts) as a percentage of total covered payroll. The denominator is the highest past annual payout rate (benefi ts as a percentage of payroll for the highpayout period). Each regression has two explanatory variables: TUR and TUR lagged one year. The two TUR variables refl ect the common observation that the recipiency rate increases in the early stages of a recession as overall unemployment is increasing but then decreases in later periods due to increased benefi t exhaustions by recipients. The expectation for these two variables is that TUR will have a positive regression coeffi cient and that lagged TUR will have a negative coeffi cient. Table 4A .1 shows these expectations are generally met. For TUR, 48 of the 51 slope coeffi cients are positive, and 29 have t ratios of at least 2.0 (a common indicator of signifi cance). For lagged TUR, 48 coeffi cients are negative, and 38 have t ratios of 2.0 or larger. Although the slope coeffi cients generally have the expected signs, the regression fi ts are modest. The average adjusted R 2 is only 0.245, and only 16 exceed 0.30. Two factors undoubtedly account for the low R 2 values. First, there is considerable noise in state-level estimates of annual unemployment (the denominator of the recipiency rate variables) due to the limited size of Current Population Survey samples in individual states. Second, several other factors infl uence unemployment and UI recipiency at the state level, and those factors are not controlled for in the regressions.
Appendix 4A State-Level Recipiency Rate Regressions
After the regressions were fi tted, the regression errors were noted for each year. Table 4 .4 in the text). The underlying projections for the individual years were saved and are available, but the text presents four-year average residuals for simplicity. 
